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SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DRAFT FOR





T HE WARSAW CONVENTION of 1929 (the Warsaw
Convention), though amended many times during the
past several decades, remains the sole convention regulat-
ing air carriers. The Warsaw Convention contains a set of
international principles designed to promote uniformity
in resolving legal claims arising out of contracts for inter-
national air carriage. The Warsaw Convention, com-
bined with several subsequent conventions and protocols,
establishes a complicated international legal system for
international carriage by air called the Warsaw system of
international carriage by air. The Warsaw system consists
of the Warsaw Convention, the Guadalajara Convention
of 1961, a supplementary convention, and the following
six protocols: 1) the Hague Protocol, 2) the Guatemala
Protocol, 3) the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 1, 4)
the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 2, 5) the Montreal
Additional Protocol No. 3, and 6) the Montreal Additional
Protocol No. 4.
The Warsaw Convention imposes the burden of proof
on the air carrier instead of the victim, thus presuming the
air carrier's fault for personal or property damages caused
* Dean, Professor of Law, LLD, College of Law, Soong Sil University, Seoul,
the Republic of Korea.
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during international air carriage.' The Warsaw system
places liability for damages suffered in the course of or in
the event of an interruption of operation of the aircraft on
the air carrier. However, the Warsaw system does limit
the air carrier's liability to a certain amount of money de-
pending upon whether the resulting injury is personal in-
jury or death, or the loss, damage or destruction of
cargo.2 The Warsaw Convention has been amended
many times to increase the maximum amount of damages
for which an air carrier is liable for personal injury or
property loss because of an increasing desire to protect
passengers injured during an international flight.
The Rome Convention of 1933 (the Rome Conven-
tion), amended in 1952 and again in 1978, provides for
limited liability for damages caused by foreign aircraft to
third parties on the surface during international carriage
by air. Like the Warsaw Convention, the Rome Conven-
tion imposes no-fault liability (strict liability) on the air
carrier. Both the 1952 and the 1978 amendments raised
the ceiling on damages, and the 1978 amendment
adopted the SDR as the currency unit.4
Both the Warsaw Convention and the Rome Conven-
The Montreal Agreement of 1966 adopts the principle of no-fault liability,
referred to as strict liability in the Anglo-American legal system.
2 The Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Hague Protocol of 1955, the Montreal
Agreement of 1966 and the Guatemala Protocol of 1971 adopted the Gold Franc
based upon the gold standard system as the currency unit used to determine the
maximum amount of damages. The Montreal Additional Protocol No. 1, Protocol
No. 2, Protocol No. 3 and Protocol No. 4 of 1975 adopted the Special Drawing
Right (SDR), which is the currency unit of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). 1 SDR, the currency unit of the IMF, equalled $1.27 at the end of 1980,
$1.16 at the end of 1981, $1.10 at the end of 1982 and 1983, and $.98 at the end
of 1984, as measured by the foreign exchange rate in the Republic of Korea.
Kim, Doo Hwan, A Study On the Liability of the Air Carrier and the Legisla-
tive Problems 2-72 (1984) (LLD Dissertation) [hereinafter Study]; Sugie, Gold Franc
in the Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, 25 J. AIR L. [KUHO] 4 (1984) [hereinafter
Gold Franc]. (Throughout the footnotes, the foreign name for the cited journal
will be included in brackets.)
4 Kim, Doo Hwan, Air Carrier's Liability for Damage Caused to Third Parties on the
Surface by Foreign Aircraft (pts. 1-3), THEJ.JUST. & ADMIN. [Sabeob-Haengjung] 29-
37 (Aug. 1983), 23-33 (Sept. 1983), 49-60 (Oct. 1983) [hereinafter Air Carrier's
Liability].
1988] INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LIABILITY
tion 5 have played a major role in the international legal
system for air transportation. Many amendments have
been proposed to each convention due to the rapid tech-
nological developments in aviation, the changes in social
and economic environments, the difficulties in proof and
discovery of facts, and the need for increasing protection
of injured passengers. Not all of the proposed amend-
ments have been enacted, however. As a result, the inter-
national legal system for air transportation is presently
complicated and tangled. Since the early 1970s, many
aviation law professors and lawyers have tried to integrate
and simplify the international legal system for air
transportation.6
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
and the affiliated organization of the United Nations have
finally made a resolution which recognizes the need for a
new draft for the Warsaw Convention to make the Warsaw
system more integrated and less complicated.7 Hopefully,
a new proposal for an integrated system can be devised in
the near future.
Professor Bin Cheng of London University, chairman of
the Air Law Committee of the International Law Associa-
tion (ILA),8 and Professor Jacqueline Dutheil de la
See id. (pts. 1 & 2), at 29-37 (Aug. 1983), 23-33 (Sept. 1983), for the details of
the Rome Convention of 1933, the amended Rome Convention of 1952 and 1978,
and the legislation of developed countries.
'I Boyle, The Warsaw Convention - Past, Present and Future, in ESSAYS IN AIR LAW 1
(1982); Matte, Should the Warsaw System be Denounced or Integrated?, 5 ANNALS OF AIR
& SPACE L. 201 (1980).
JAPAN AVIATION ASs'N, AIR TRANSPORTATION 337 (1981).
The International Law Association (ILA) was created by law professors and
lawyers from around the world in Brussels in 1873. They wrote the York-Antwerp
Rules concerning General Average and other conventions concerning collisions
between ships, air transportation, and space law. The ILA, an authoritative re-
search organization, has its headquarters in London. It has established branch
offices in the U.S.A., France, West Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Poland and
Japan and has more than 4,500 members.
The ILA holds its conferences once every two years. The ILA has held its con-
ferences in Hague (1970), New York (1972), New Delhi (1974), Madrid (1976),
Manila (1978), Belgrade (1980), Montreal (1982), Paris (1984), and Seoul (1986).
The 63rd Conference will be held in Warsaw in 1988. Many famous lawyers, law
professors, including law professors from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
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Roch~re have written a "draft of the convention on an in-
tegrated system of international aviation liability covering
surface damage cause by foreign aircraft during interna-
tional carriage by air." The Draft for the Convention (the
Draft) written by Prof. Bin Cheng places unlimited liabil-
ity for personal injury or death and limited liability for
loss, damage or destruction of cargo caused by an air acci-
dent on the international air carrier. The liability is an
absolute, secured and channeled liability which imposes a
much heavier liability on international air carriers than
the existing Warsaw system.
The purpose of Professor Bin Cheng's Draft is to unify
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which limit air
carrier liability under an air transportation contract for
personal or property damages and the provisions of the
Rome Convention which limit the tort liability of a foreign
air carrier for damage caused to third parties on the sur-
face. This proposal calls for the integration and unifica-
tion of contract and tort liability within one convention. It
could dramatically and fundamentally reform the Warsaw
system and could become the basis for unification of in-
ternational private aviation law. Thus, it is worthwhile to
study the Draft for the Convention even though it is not
expected to become an effective convention in the near
future. In light of the importance of the Draft, this analy-
sis will now turn to an explanation and brief history of the
Draft, including its background, framework, and guiding
principles. This analysis will then conclude with com-
ments and my own opinions concerning the Draft.9
chiefjustices, and justice ministers participated in air law sessions of the ILA dur-
ing the Paris and Seoul conferences. The organizations under the U.N. partici-
pated as observers. Fujita, The 62nd (1986) Conference of the International Law
Association in Seoul, 85J. INT'L L. & DIPL. [Kokusaiho Gaiko Zassi] 101-03 (1987).
This article is based upon the materials and information received during the ILA
air law sessions in Paris and Seoul.
1- The proposed Draft was discussed by both aviation law professors and lawyers
at the air law session of the 60th Conference of the ILA held at Montreal, Canada
from August 29 to September 4, 1982, but was not adopted. Instead, the Confer-
ence decided that the Draft should be analyzed and reviewed by the air law session
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DRAFT FOR THE
CONVENTION
The Air Law Committee of the ILA has discussed the
liability problems of air carriers since the Helsinki Confer-
ence of 1966. The air law session of the London Confer-
ence of the ILA (1967) initiated a discussion concerning
the possibility of an integrated system of air carrier liabil-
ity. This discussion first raised the issue of the desirability
of imposing an absolute, unlimited and secured liability
upon air carriers in an effort to deal with the problems of
an air carrier's civil liability to passengers and other inter-
ested parties.' 0
Unfortunately, because urgent problems regarding the
international legal system for hovercraft and the interna-
tional regulation of aircraft hijacking took precedent dur-
ing the 53rd Conference of the ILA in 1968, discussion of
an integrated system for air carrier liability was suspended
until 1976. During the 57th Conference of the ILA held in
Madrid in 1976, a report concerning an integrated system
for the liability of air carriers based upon the principles of
absolute, unlimited and secured liability was submitted by
Canadian Professor R. H. Mankiewicz." Thus, the air law
session of the ILA resumed discussion of an integrated
system for air carrier liability. For the purpose of handling
this topic, the Air Law Deliberation Committee was estab-
lished which consisted of such famous air law specialists
as Professor H. K. B6ckstiegel, Dr. M. Bodenshatz, D.
P. Chauveau, Dr. W. Guldimann, Professor R. H.
Mankiewicz, Professor N. M. Matte, and Professor R. Nys.
The Air Law Deliberation Committee considered a mem-
orandum dealing with an integrated liability system for air
carriers submitted by Professor Bin Cheng. In considera-
tion of some opinions presented by the committee, Pro-
of the ILA. The Draft was heatedly discussed in both the 1982 and 1984 air law
sessions of the ILA.
o See Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference Held at Belgrade, INT'L L. ASS'N 471-72
(1982).
, Id. at 472.
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fessor Bin Cheng rewrote the report on an integrated
liability system. The revised report was then transferred
to the Air Law Deliberation Committee of the 59th Con-
ference of the ILA held at Belgrade on August 19, 1980.12
Professor Bin Cheng explained the details of his report
to the Air Law Deliberation Committee, but he received
much critical opposition. The Belgrade Conference of
1980 advised that three guiding principles be addressed
in future air law sessions. First, an integrated system of
civil aviation liability should be initiated with regard both
to damage sustained by passengers or caused to baggage
or cargo during international carriage by air, and to dam-
age caused to third parties on the surface by foreign air-
craft. Second, all claims should be channelled through
the carrier and the operator of the aircraft respectively.
Third, a carrier's liability for personal injuries, including
death, should be absolute, unlimited and secured. The
committee recommended that a Draft be prepared in ac-
cordance with Professor Bin Cheng's report and the
above three principles before the Montreal Conference of
1982.13
As a result, a brief Draft was submitted at the 60th Con-
ference of the ILA held in Montreal in 1982. It consisted
of four articles written by Professor Mankiewicz in accord-
ance with the above three principles and a detailed Draft
consisting of seventy-nine articles written by Professor
Bin Cheng with the cooperation of Professor Jacqueline
Dutheil de la Rochere. The following section of this arti-
cle focuses on the detailed Draft written by Professor Bin
Cheng.
III. THE BACKGROUND OF THE DRAFT FOR
THE CONVENTION
The Draft for the Convention proposes a liability prin-
ciple applicable both to an international air carrier's con-
21 Id.
-. Id. at 473.
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tract liability for damages caused during air carriage and
to a foreign aircraft's tort liability for damages caused to
third parties on the surface. The Draft provides that the
air carrier or the operator of the aircraft shall bear abso-
lute, unlimited and secured liability and all claims shall be
channelled through the carrier and the operator of the
aircraft respectively. Such a liability principle seems radi-
cal and progressive.' 4
A. Issues With Respect to the Warsaw Convention
Since the conclusion of the Warsaw Convention in
1929, technology has advanced and national incomes
have increased. In addition, the value of life and property
have increased substantially. Due to changes in economic
and social circumstances, the difficulty in burden of proof,
the move from fault liability to absolute liability, and the
influence of court judgments regarding aircraft accidents,
the Warsaw Convention has been amended many times
through protocols, agreements and conventions.' 5  De-
spite its many amendments, the Warsaw Convention has
played an important role in air transportation legal
14 The background for Professor Bin Cheng's radical proposal may be summa-
rized from the articles written by Professor Bin Cheng, his reports submitted to
the Belgrade Convention of 1980 and to the Montreal Convention of 1982, and
articles written by Professor K. Fujita. Cheng, Fifty Years of the Warsaw Convention:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 1979 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR Lurr UND WELTRAUMRECHT 373
(1979) [hereinafter Fifty Years].
'- Study, supra note 3, at 85. The Warsaw Convention, which concluded in 1929,
has been either amended or supplemented through the Hague Protocol of 1955,
the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, the Montreal Agreement of 1966, the Gua-
temala Protocol of 1971 and the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 3, and
4. However, the Warsaw system of international carriage by air was complicated
by the fact that the Diplomacy Committee of the United States Senate refused to
ratify the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 and 4, which are not yet effective.
In my opinion, if the United States had ratified the Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and
4, Korea and Japan might have ratified them, thereby promoting an amendment
to existing aviation laws which would describe the civil liability of air carriers more
concretely.
In Great Britain, the Carriage by Air and Road Act of 1979 reflects the contents
of the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 and 4. Furthermore, according to a
decision of the British Civil Aviation Office, British Airways and British Caledo-
nian Airways incorporated the provisions of the Protocols into the general terms
and conditions of their air transportation contracts in April, 1981. Id.
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problems. At present, more than 110 countries are affili-
ated with the Warsaw Convention and more than 100
countries are affiliated with the Hague Protocols. In addi-
tion, in accordance with domestic laws on domestic air
transport of the contracting country, the Warsaw Conven-
tion extends to non-Warsaw air transportation. Assur-
edly, the Warsaw Convention is the most important and
widely used convention in the area of private aviation
law. 16 As to why the Warsaw Convention was accepted
worldwide and has lasted so long, my opinions are as
follows:
1) the Warsaw Convention has provisions for very com-
prehensive regulations and, unlike the Hague Protocols, it
covers passengers and baggage as well as cargo;
2) the Warsaw Convention's provisions and regulations
are very simple. When a passenger suffers death or per-
sonal injury, or cargo or baggage is damaged, destroyed,
or lost, the air carrier bears the burden of proof and is
presumed to be at fault. The air carrier's liability is lim-
ited, however, to a specified amount of money unless it is
guilty of willful misconduct or gross negligence;
3) the provisions of the Warsaw Convention are com-
pulsory and mandatory, so they can be effectively applied
and efficiently enforced (Convention Article 24). The
provisions for compulsory adjudicative jurisdiction (Con-
vention Article 28) make litigation speedy and efficient as
well.
While the Warsaw Convention has merit, it also has
many weaknesses. After World War II, the United States
tried to withdraw from the Warsaw Convention, arguing
that the maximum amount for air carrier liability was too
low and unreasonable. At that time, the liability of an air
carrier for each passenger killed or injured was limited to
$8,300. Because the maximum limited amount included
attorney's fees, which are higher in the United States than
in any other country, the maximum limited amount was
"; Fifty Years, supra note 14, at 373.
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considered relatively lower in the United States than in
other countries. Through mediation with the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA), the United
States cancelled its withdrawal proposal. Due to the at-
tempted withdrawal of the United States, the Montreal
Agreement was concluded in 1966. It provided for abso-
lute liability and raised the maximum amount of liability.
Although the Montreal Agreement increased the maxi-
mum limited amount nine times to $75,000, however, the
American dissatisfaction with the limited amount
continued.
The original drafters of the Warsaw Convention are not
to blame for the relatively low amount of limited liability
because Article 22, Paragraph 4 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion linked the maximum limited amount to the Poincare
Franc.' 7 Instead, governments of member countries are
to blame, because they adopted the official price of gold
to measure the maximum limited amount. This limited
amount was lower than the amount fixed by the original
drafters."' Influenced by changes in the currency system,
a court upheld a calculation based upon the free market
price of gold. 19 As a result, the 21st air law session of the
ICAO in 1974 discussed the problem of the conversion of
the gold franc into national currencies. A resolution was
passed providing that the calculation of foreign exchange
should not be based on the free market price of gold.20
Thus, Montreal Additional Protocol Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4
adopted the Special Drawing Right (SDR) system of the
17 Article 22, Paragraph 4 of the Warsaw Convention provides that the sums
mentioned in Paragraph 3 shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting
of 65 and 1/2 milligrams gold of millesimal fineness 900.
,- Fujita, Some Considerations of Draft Convention on an Integrated System of Interna-
tional Aviation Liability, 25 J. AIR L. [KUHO] 89 (1984) [hereinafter Some
Considerations].
19 Olympic Airways v. Zacopoulos, IATA Air Carrier's Liability Report No. 461
(1974); Saga v. Sagoland, 29 RFDA 138 (1973); see Gold Franc, supra note 3, at 1-
41, 138.
211 I.C.A.O., Doc. 9131 -LC/173-2 at 26.
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International Monetary Fund instead of the gold franc.2 '
With regard to the maximum amount of air carrier liabil-
ity, the problem of conversion of the gold franc was
solved by adopting the SDR as the measure of the maxi-
mum amount. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Convention
should be amended more fundamentally. 2
B. Reasons Why the Warsaw Convention Should be Amended
Many economic and social changes have occurred since
the Warsaw Convention was effectuated. First, due to the
rapid development of science and technology in the aero-
nautic industry, the age of propeller aircraft transporta-
tion is gone. This is the age of transportation by
supersonic jet aircraft. Compensation for damages caused
by aircraft accidents has increased in dollar amount as
well as in volume. Air carrier liability should extend to
loss of expectation of leisure activities, as well as to dam-
age to property, and mental and physical injuries.
Second, because the aircraft industry is a very compli-
cated assembling industry, it utilizes many people in a va-
riety of jobs, including parts manufacturers, air service
suppliers, airport employees, air traffic controllers, gov-
ernmental agencies, and manufacturers or suppliers of
aircraft facilities. When victims are not satisfied with the
limited amount for which an airline corporation is liable
under the current limited liability system, they tend to
bring claims against the manufacturer of the aircraft or
2 The SDR was also adopted as the unit currency of the Convention on Limita-
tion of Liability for Maritime Claims of 1976, the Athens Convention Amendment
Protocol of 1976, the Convention Concerning Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Amendment Protocol of 1976, the International Fund for Compensating Dam-
ages Caused by Oil Pollution Amendment Protocol of 1976, the UN Convention
on Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1978 (Hamburg Rule), the Ship Owner's Liability
Limitation Convention Amendment Protocol of 1979, the Uniform Convention
Relating to Bills of Lading of 1979 (The Hague-Visby Rule), the UN Convention
on International Multimodal Transportation of Goods of 1980, and other mari-
time conventions. Gold Franc, supra note 3, at 3-4; Kim, Doo Hwan, A Study on Air
Cargo Carrier's Liability, THE SHIPPER [Hajoo] 11-12 (Fall, 1982).
22 Fifty Years, supra note 14, at 376. B6ckstiegel, Coordinating Aviation Liability, 2
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 15 (1977) [hereinafter Liability].
[53
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the air traffic controller for the balance of their damages
which are not thoroughly compensated by the airline cor-
poration. The Warsaw Convention does not cover claims
against parties other than the air carriers. Thus, the air
carrier may take advantage of the liability limitation, while
the aircraft manufacturer or the air traffic controller can-
not. This disregards equity and distributive justice.
Third, the liability limitation in the Warsaw system is
controversial and questionable. The Warsaw Convention
allowed the limitation of air carrier liability because the
aircraft business was very dangerous and risky at the time
of the Warsaw Convention. It seemed fair and reasonable
that the air carrier should not be fully responsible for all
the damages caused by an accident, and that the passen-
ger should bear part of the risk or damage. In light of the
developments in technology and safety of air transporta-
tion, this reason for the liability limitation does not exist
anymore.
Fourth, because the Warsaw Convention is very compli-
cated, the passengers receiving compensation for dam-
ages caused in the same aircraft accident have very
different rights according to the jurisdiction in question
even though the passengers paid the same freight.2" This
discriminates among the passengers and cannot be justi-
fied anymore.
Fifth, insurance poses a problem. Nowadays almost all
the damages resulting from air transportation are covered
by insurance. The final and ultimate payer of the pre-
mium is the passenger or consignor of cargo. The
problems of indemnity in insurance law are closely related
to social justice problems. Influenced by the development
of insurance, some scholars have argued for the principle
.1 Every country has its own method for determining the damages for which the
air carrier is liable. Therefore, if there is no liability limitation, the amount of
money the injured passenger receives depends upon the jurisdiction in question
and its criteria for compensation. As a result, the passengers of the same aircraft
receive varying and unequal treatment. Thus, discrepancy and inequity among
passengers will always exist without some fixed, limited amount of liability per
passenger applicable in all jurisdictions.
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of absolute liability. When the Montreal Agreement of
1966 adopted the principle of absolute liability, it simpli-
fied the procedure for claiming damages.
The Warsaw system has played a very important role in
the transportation of passengers. Professor Bin Cheng as-
serts, however, that the present air law system could not
settle air law problems and disputes without dramatic and
comprehensive reforms of the Warsaw Convention. On
the other hand, Professor Karl Heinz Bocksteigel, Profes-
sor A. Tobolewski and Esq. Deter Martin have asserted
that even partial reform can solve the problems.2 4
IV. THE PLAN AND STRUCTURE OF THE DRAFT
FOR THE CONVENTION
A. Plan
The most serious problem with the current liability sys-
tem results from the fact that, because of the danger and
risk of air transportation at the time of the Warsaw sys-
tem, the Warsaw Convention focused on the protection of
the interests of air carriers. Nowadays, as a result of in-
creasing technology, the pressure is mounting to impose
much heavier liability on the air carrier than before in or-
der to protect the passengers and other consumers. The
Draft proposes provisions that are fair to consumers, that
protect users such as passengers and that make proce-
dures simple and convenient. The Draft describes an in-
tegrated liability system to the extent that it covers all the
civil air carrier's liabilities with respect to damages sus-
tained by passengers or baggage or cargo during an inter-
national carriage by air, as well as damages caused by
foreign aircraft to third parties on the surface.
The reasons for integrating provisions for damages
caused by foreign aircraft to third parties on the surface
-, Liability, supra note 22, at 15; Martin, After 50 Years of the Warsaw Convention -
What Next?, AEROSPACE 14 (March, 1980) [hereinafter What Next?]; Tobolewski,
Against Limitation of Liability: A Radical Proposal, 3 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 261
(1978).
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with provisions for damages sustained by passengers, bag-
gage or cargo are as follows: 1) the civil operator's liability
with respect to the former gives rise to the same or similar
problem with respect to the latter; 2) the provision of the
Amended Rome Convention of 1952 for the civil opera-
tor's liability with respect to damages caused to third par-
ties on the surface by foreign aircraft has not worked; and
3) although amended at Montreal in 1978, the Warsaw
Convention needs sweeping and comprehensive reform in
order to solve its fundamental problems. 25 The resolu-
tion and recommendation of the air law session of the ILA
held at Belgrade in 1980 provided the fundamental
framework which unifies and consolidates the civil air car-
rier's liability with respect both to damages caused to pas-
sengers, baggage or cargo based upon the transportation
contract and to damages caused to third parties on the
surface based upon the concept of tort.
B. Structure
The Draft for the Convention is divided into two parts.
Part One deals with international carriage by air, while
Part Two deals with surface damage caused by foreign air-
craft. Although both parts are based on the same guiding
principles, they could be treated as two separate conven-
tions. This would enable the two parts to be accepted, if
necessary, separately. Part One takes as its point of depar-
ture the Warsaw Convention as amended at Hague in
1955, at Guatemala City in 1971, and by Montreal Addi-
tional Protocols Nos. 3 and 4. From this point of view, the
consolidated text as found in the First Schedule to the
United Kingdom Carriage by Air and Road Act of 1979
has been very helpful. The 1961 Guadalajara Supplemen-
tary Convention has also been incorporated into the
Draft. Part Two takes as its point of departure the Rome
Convention of 1952 as amended at Montreal in 1978.
2 Fujita, ICAO's Activity With Regard to Legal Problems and Its Recent Two Years Re-
suit, 26 JURISPRUDENCE J. [Hougakoo Zassi] 504.
777
778 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
In order to make it easier to compare the Draft for the
Convention with the Warsaw Convention, the Draft main-
tains, where possible, the articles and expressions of the
Convention. The articles of the Warsaw Convention
which were taken into consideration in the Draft, and the
intent and purport of the articles of the Draft, are ex-
plained in the official comments to each article of the
Draft. The first part of the Draft consists of forty-one arti-
cles, and the second part consists of thirty articles. The
framework of the Draft is as follows:
Part One: International Carriage by Air
Chapter I. Scope - Definitions (Articles 1 and 2)
Chapter II. Documents of Carriage 6
Section 1. Passenger Ticket (Article 3)
Section 2. Baggage Check (Article 4)
Section 3. Documents Relating to Cargo (Articles 5
to 16)
Chapter III. Liability of the Carrier (Articles 17 to 30)
Chapter IV. Provisions Relating to Combined Car-
riage (Article 31)
Chapter V. General and Final Provisions (Articles 32
to 41)
Part Two: Surface Damage by Foreign Aircraft
Chapter I. Principles of Liability (Articles 1 to 10)
Chapter II. Extent of Liability (Articles 11 to 14)
(Because the Draft does not adopt the liability limi-
tation system, the maximum amount provisions
presented by the Rome Convention have been
omitted in order to provide for unlimited liability);
Chapter III. Security for Operator's Liability
(Article 15) (Articles 16 to 19 of the Rome Conven-
tion have been omitted because they deal with the
scheme of limited liability);
2(i Although it is noted that the Draft for the Convention has more supplemen-
tary provisions than the Guatemala Protocol for dealing with the delivery of docu-
ments of carriage, they are largely based upon the related provisions of the
Warsaw Convention. Fujita, Draft Convention on an Integrated System of International
Aviation Liability Covering International Carriage by Air and Surface Damage Caused by
Foreign Aircraft, 29 JURISPRUDENCE J. [Hougakoo Zassi] 120 (1983).
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Chapter IV. Rules of Procedure and Limitation of Ac-
tion (Articles 20 to 22)
Chapter V. Application of the Convention and Gen-
eral Provisions (Articles 23 to 30)
Chapter VI. Final Provisions
V. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE DRAFT
FOR THE CONVENTION
The two parts of the Draft, one dealing with damage
caused during carriage by air and the other with surface
damage, are linked because they are both based on the
same guiding principles: 1) liability for all damage arising
during carriage by air or surface damage shall be unlim-
ited; 2) this liability shall be absolute and secured, except
for damage arising from delay; and 3) all claims arising
from carriage by air and surface damage caused by for-
eign aircraft shall be channelled through the carrier and
the operator respectively. The following section explains
and discusses the guiding principles in more detail.
A. Absolute Liability
Since the Guatemala Protocol of 1971 adopted the
strict liability principle, the presumption of fault placed
on the air carrier has disappeared. However, opposition
to the absolute liability principle still exists.2 7 In devel-
oped countries, absolute liability has become the control-
ling liability principle and plays a very important role in
determining liability. Articles 17 to 21 of the Draft contain
the absolute liability provisions.2 8 This absolute liability
principle applies to all injury to passengers and cargo or
baggage during international carriage by air. Delay dam-
ages, on the other hand, are still governed by the fault
presumption principle.
Certain exceptions to absolute liability may apply so
27 V. ESCALADA, AERONAUTICAL LAw 550 (1979).
2m Report of the Sixtieth Conference Held at Montreal, INT'L L. ASS'N 562-64 (1983)
[hereinafter Sixtieth Conference].
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that the air carrier avoids liability. For example, the Gua-
temala Protocol Article 17, Paragraph 2 provides that the
air carrier is not liable if damage to baggage results solely
from an inherent defect, quality or vice of the baggage.
Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the Draft contains four excep-
tions to the absolute liability principle regarding damage
caused to cargo by the following: (1) an inherent defect,
quality or vice of the cargo; (2) defective packing of the
cargo performed by a person other than the carrier or his
servants or agents; (3) an act of war or an armed conflict;
or (4) an act of public authority carried out in connection
with the entry, exit or transit of the cargo. 29 In the car-
riage of passengers, cargo or baggage, if the carrier
proves that the person claiming compensation caused or
contributed to the damage through negligence, a wrong-
ful act, or an omission, the carrier shall be wholly or partly
exonerated from his liability to such person. The burden
of proof as well as exemption from liability of the air car-
rier in the carriage of passengers and cargo are provided
for in more detail in Article 21 of the Draft.
B. Unlimited Liability
Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Hague Pro-
tocol of 1955, the Montreal Agreement of 1966, the Gua-
temala Protocol of 1971, the Montreal Additional
Protocols Nos. 1,2, 3, and 4 of 1975 and the Amended
Rome Convention, the air carrier or aircraft operator
bears only limited liability with respect to both personal
injury and material loss caused by an aircraft accident.
The limited liability provisions with respect to personal
loss (death or injury to passenger) are omitted in the
Draft for the Convention of 1982. Adoption of unlimited
liability for personal injury was a radical suggestion, which
shocked the worldwide air law society and gave rise to
continuing arguments among air law scholars.
'21 Id. at 563; see Fitzgerald, The Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Montreal Con-
ference on International Air Law, 1 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 49, 55 (1976).
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Opponents emphasize that unlimited liability would
make it very hard to calculate and fix the amount of the
premiums and the insurable value for international avia-
tion insurance. Professor Bin Cheng counters that the de-
gree of premium increase would be relatively small, and
that existing laws already impose unlimited liability on
many parties, including manufacturers and corpora-
tions. ° In addition, unlimited liability has succeeded with
regard to damage caused during domestic transportation
by U.S. civil aircraft and even with respect to damage on
the U.S. surface caused by British aircraft. Thus, no rea-
son exists for maintaining the limited liability principle
only for international carriage by air since the unlimited
liability principle works very well for domestic air trans-
portation in the United States.3 '
Unlike the unlimited liability principle for personal loss,
the Draft adopts a limited liability principle for loss, dam-
age or delay of cargo or baggage in Article 22.32 The
maximum amount for limited liability is based upon the
currency unit of SDR of the IMF as described in the Mon-
treal Additional Protocols of 1975. The Draft's provisions
for limited liability for damage caused to cargo or bag-
gage are derived mainly from the Guatemala Protocol and
the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 except for the fol-
lowing two improvements.
First, the maximum amount of limited liability is in-
creased two or three times. In the carriage of baggage,
the limited liability of the carrier in the case of destruc-
, See Some Considerations, supra note 18, at 98.
Materials regarding how much the insurance premium is for domestic air
transportation in the United States or Japan, where the unlimited liability princi-
ple applies to domestic air transportation, should be collected and analyzed
before the Draft is enacted. In addition, materials regarding how much an insur-
ance premium would increase for international carriage by air if the limited liabil-
ity principle is replaced by the unlimited liability principle should be studied.
Although the increase of insurance premiums seems to matter to large airline cor-
porations of developed countries, the same amount of increase might be even
more burdensome to the small or medium-sized airline corporations of develop-
ing countries.
12 Sixtieth Conference, supra note 28, at 564-65.
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tion, loss, damage or delay went up to 2,000 SDR for each
passenger,33 twice as much as the amount provided for in
Guatemala Protocol No. 3. For the carriage of cargo, it
increased to fifty SDR per kilogram, 4 or three times the
amount provided for by the Montreal Additional Protocol
No. 4. Such an increase should protect the interests of
passengers and cargo owners and induce carriers to im-
prove security over baggage or cargo.
Second, the Draft prescribes that the sum of limited lia-
bility specified in Article 21 of the Draft shall not apply if
it is proven that the damage resulted from a wrongful act
or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, or acts
committed with intent to cause damage.
This exception considers the greater burden placed on
the air carrier due to the absolute liability principle and to
the increase in the maximum amount of limited liability.
It brings the article back in line with the deepseated legal
conviction of all civil law systems.35
C. Secured Liability
Although the principle of absolute liability makes the
legal procedure more efficient and the principle of unlim-
ited liability for passenger injury or death insures suffi-
cient compensation for victims, they do not make any
sense if the air carrier does not bear the liability com-
pletely. Thus, the Draft establishes security or guarantee
provisions to make sure the air carrier compensates the
passenger or consigner thoroughly. 6 The framework
3' Id. at 564.
44 Id.
3 Some Considerations, supra note 18, at 100.
.- Examples of international guarantees for secured payment are as follows: the
Rome Convention of 1952 with regard to Surface Damage Caused to Third Par-
ties by Foreign Aircraft, the OECD Convention regarding Nuclear Accident of
July 29, 1960 (the Paris Convention of 1960), the Vienna Convention of 1963
regarding Civil Liability for Nuclear Accident, the Brussels Convention of 1962
regarding Liability of the Operator of Nuclear Ships, the Tanker Owner's Volun-
tary Agreement on the Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), the Agreement on
Provision Compensation with respect to Tanker Owner's Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of
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Professor Bin Cheng developed is a three-fold method of
guarantee involving (1) self insurance, (2) cooperative in-
surance, and (3) governmental insurance.37
According to Professor Bin Cheng's framework, the
first step involves the air carrier or the aircraft manufac-
turer taking self-insurance measures to cover its own lia-
bility.38 In this case, the air carrier or the airplane
manufacturer may insure goods as well as take out self-
insurance. If the first step is impractical, as its substitute
the air carrier and the aircraft manufacturer may purchase
compulsory or voluntary insurance through mutual coop-
eration.3 9 If this second step is too difficult, under the
third step the government bears the ultimate liability and
distributes the risk to all the people in case of damage
caused to third parties on the surface.40
Article 35A (1) of the Draft requires every carrier to
maintain either insurance or some other form of financial
security, including guarantee, covering his liability for
such damage as may arise under this Draft in such
amount, of such type and in such terms as the national
State of the carrier may specify. 4' The carrier may be re-
quired by the State in which he operates to provide evi-
dence that it has fulfilled this requirement by producing
appropriate certificates.42 This provision replaces Article
35A of the Guatemala Protocol on supplementary com-
pensation schemes.43
One of the most important principles in the integrated
1969, the International Convention for the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 1971, the Convention on
Space of 1967, and the Convention relating to the Compensation for Damage in
Space of 1972.
37 Fifty Years, supra note 14, at 382. The Draft adopts a back-up method of guar-





41 Sixtieth Conference, supra note 28, at 572-73.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 573.
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liability system is the secured liability principle. 4 Thus,
some measures should be taken to insure the air carrier
compensates for injuries. The kind of measures taken
would depend on the State concerned. 45 The State con-
cerned may specify, at its discretion, the amount, type and
terms of the financial security to be provided. 46 In addi-
tion, the State may require its air carriers to establish
some kind of indemnity club or compensation fund as in
the maritime industry.47 This kind of measure could be
accomplished through a multilateral agreement among
states and thus be somewhat advantageous to the devel-
oping countries which have only small or medium-sized
airline corporations.4 8 A system of secured liability en-
sures that compensation shall always be effectively paid.
In line with precedents set in the field of space activi-
ties, Article 35B provides that the State of the carrier be-
comes the ultimate guarantor if the carrier and any person
furnishing financial security pursuant to Article 35A fail to
meet their liabilities.49 Thus, Article 35B makes doubly
sure that compensation will always be paid. Since the na-
tional State of the carrier will have to ensure that the lia-
bilities of its carriers will be met in full, it is free to
arrange the matter in any way it sees fit.50 In light of Arti-
cle 35A, it is most unlikely that Article 35B will ever be
invoked. 5' But since it depends upon the type of meas-




47 Id. An indemnity club or compensation fund can act either as a safety net for
its participants, or as a form of mutual insurance which will take over the liability
of the participants when it exceeds given limits. "In the latter event, limited liabil-
ity of the carrier can be combined with full compensation to the victims of air
accidents." Id.
48 Id. It would be helpful to get assistance from the ICAO, the IATA or other
regional organizations. Id.
411 Id. The national State of the carrier also becomes responsible for the liabili-
ties of the carrier in those cases where the State permits its carriers to obtain
financial security only up to a specified maxima. Id.
-0 Id. at 573-74.
- Id. at 574.
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like the unlimited liability principle, deserves severe dis-
cussion during the air law session of the ILA.
D. Channeling of Liability
According to the Draft, the channeling of liability is due
to the absolute, unlimited and secured liability imposed
upon only the air carrier when damage results during in-
ternational carriage by air. Liability is channeled directly
through the air carrier. But if the carrier has paid com-
pensation under the Draft for the personal injury or the
death of a passenger, or for the destruction, loss of, or
damage to baggage or cargo, then such a carrier could
acquire by subrogation the rights of the person so com-
pensated against any third party involved in the event that
caused the injury or death, or the destruction, loss or
damage of cargo. 2
The channeling of liability to the air carrier lowers the
probability that a claimant will look to the aircraft manu-
facturer and other related persons for damages. As a re-
sult, an air carrier may receive indemnity through the
London insurance market more easily, speedily and effi-
ciently.5 In spite of the merits of channeling liability, a
serious problem is whether the air carrier who compen-
sated the claimant for the damage can really and effi-
ciently execute the right of subrogation against the third
party. On the one hand, the channeling of the air carrier's
liability becomes advantageous to the victims of the acci-
dent. On the other hand, the air carrier may bear more
risk or more burden if execution of the right of subroga-
tion is inefficient and difficult.
52 The provisions detailing channeled liability are derived from the Guatemala
Protocol and the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4, and the wording has been
borrowed from Article 9 of the 1963 Vienna Convention of Civil Liability for Nu-
clear Accident. See Yamazaki, Legislation of Air Cargo Transportation, No. 18, 19J. AIR
L. [KUHO] 83 (1976). The Draft for the Convention, Article 30K Section 1
stated: "[niothing in this Draft for the Convention shall prejudice the question
whether a person liable for damage in accordance with its provisions has a right of
recourse against any other person." Some Considerations, supra note 18, at 93.
5. What Next?, supra note 24, at 19.
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VI. CRITIQUES OF THE DRAFT FOR THE CONVENTION
A. Major Critiques
Professor Martin Bradley of the Air and Space Law Re-
search Institute, McGill University, played the role of the
Secretariat of the 60th Conference of the ILA in Montreal
in 1982. He spoke on behalf of Director Nicolas M.
Matte, Professor P. Haanappel, Professor Jean-Louis
Magdelenat and Dr. Ludwig Weber.54 Professor Bradley
stated that they took issue, not with the Draft, but with the
principles underlying it that were agreed on at Belgrade.5 5
Another objection to the Draft was that the project was
premature.56 In Bradley's opinion, the United States was
on the threshold of ratifying Montreal Additional Proto-
col No. 3 and Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4, and it
was probable that when the United States ratified, a sub-
stantial number of other states would follow suit. 57 Brad-
ley said that it seemed prudent, if this occurred, to see if
the Warsaw/Hague/Montreal system would work in prac-
tice. 58 Their critical argument on the principles of the
Draft concluded with three points.
First, concerning the integrated liability system, dispa-
rate subjects are being mixed in the same instrument, and
the disparate elements are liable to deter states from rati-
fying the Draft.59
Second, regarding the channeling of claims, it is unjust
to lay this burden solely on the aircraft operator. This so-
lution deprives the victim of alternative and possibly supe-
rior sources of compensation. A Draft incorporating this
principle is unlikely to enjoy sufficient industry support to
.4 Sixtieth Conference, supra note 28, at 586-87.
55 Id. at 586.
5' Id. at 586-87.
57 Id. at 587. The proposal of ratification of the Montreal Additional Protocols
Nos. 3 and 4 was submitted to the Senate of the United States, but was rejected
March 8, 1983. Tompkins, The Defeat of the Montreal Protocols in the United States
Senate - What Next?, LLOYD'S AVIATION L. 1-6 (Sept. 15, 1983).
Sixtieth Conference, supra note 28, at 587.
Id.
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secure a reasonable number of ratifications.6 °
Finally, the principle of absolute, unlimited and secured
liability is unacceptable to a large part of the international
aviation community.6' Thus, the Draft, incorporating all
three components, would not receive the universal ac-
ceptance that is necessary to make it a valid substitute for
the Warsaw system.62 In principle, a provision on secured
liability is desirable, but, in so far as it involves states as
guarantors, it is premature with regard to the present
state of development in international aviation.63 Conse-
quently, it is desirable to maintain the Warsaw Conven-
tion as amended through the Montreal Additional
Protocols Nos. 3 and 4 for the time being.6
Dr. M. Milde, Observer for the ICAO, submitted a legal
opinion that bitterly criticized the Draft. 65 He expressed
regret that at present the Draft represents an effort of
only a few scholars and that it was not subjected in suffi-
cient time to a more general discussion at a full meeting
of the Air Law Committee of the Association.6 6 Dr. Milde
stated:
I, personally, have some serious misgivings about whether
the draft is mature enough to be presented to a wider dis-
cussion in any international forum - such as ICAO or
IATA - or whether it could be presented to Governments
for further consideration .... Consequently, I formally
suggest that the draft be sent back to the Air Law Commit-
tee for further consideration, study of economic data, ju-
risprudence and statistics on claims, so as to permit it to
clarify by a wider consensus of the air law experts many
issues which, at present, appear to be highly questionable





Some Considerations, supra note 18, at 97, 108.
Sixtieth Conference, supra note 28, at 585-86.
,' Id. at 585.
67 Id.
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Dr. M. Milde has, in particular, basic doubts, misgivings
and questions about the following seven issues:
(a) Eleven years have elapsed since the adoption of the
Guatemala Protocol and seven years since the Montreal
Conference which adopted Protocols 3 and 4. These doc-
uments represent a delicate compromise reluctantly ac-
cepted by the international community, and the present
indications are that active steps are being taken to bring
these instruments into force. It would be unfortunate if
the actions by the Association were, in any way, to inter-
fere with the promising trend of recent months which
might bring the delicate compromise to a state of ripening
and bearing fruit.
(b) Any draft on liability has to take into account a host
of economic facts and data and the legal proposals have to
be firmly based on a through [sic] economic analysis. I am
afraid that it has not yet been done in the forum of the
Association. The draft Convention represents a bold and
original effort to unify the law but also, by its conse-
quences, purports to unify the standard of living and cost
of living in different parts of the international community.
(c) One of my basic problems is the concept of unlim-
ited liability. In all probability such a concept would be
fully acceptable to only one single State of the interna-
tional community and could hardly represent a basis for
unification of law. At the Guatemala City Conference,
States have reluctantly, and in the spirit of compromise
and accommodation accepted a 'high limit', but only as a
part of a package which made that high limit unbreakable
under any circumstances. It appears quite unrealistic to
expect that unlimited liability would be acceptable to any
significant portion of the international community. Fur-
thermore, 'unlimited liability' is in fact not insurable and
no insurer would give a blanket coverage and underwrite
unknown risks which might reach astronomic proportions.
(d) I cannot agree that the cost of insurance premiums
would represent only 'a toothpick in the olive in the mar-
tini' - this statement is unsupported by any convincing
economic analysis, does not state what is the actual
amount of the premiums and how those premiums would
be influenced, and also disregards the fact that different
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airlines have to pay different premiums according to the
size of their fleet and the overall record of their opera-
tions. There is sufficient proof to state that, in general,
the airlines of the developing countries with marginal op-
erations have to pay premiums vastly in excess of those
paid by well established airlines of developed countries.
(e) The draft, in fact, triples the liability for cargo and
baggage increasing the liability from 17 SDRs, per kilo-
gram to 50 SDRs, per kilogram. There does not seem to
be any economic justification for such an arbitrary dra-
matic increase, and the draft may lack, in this respect,
credibility. Again, the introduction of the concept of fault
in the carriage of cargo and baggage goes contrary to the
Montreal Protocol No. 4 of 1975; at the Montreal Confer-
ence any effort to reintroduce the concept of fault with re-
spect to cargo was soundly defeated, even in case of
criminal acts of the carrier or its servants or agents.
(f) In the proposed Article 30L the waiver of immunity
by States may be only an example of wishful thinking not
supported by the practice of States.
(g) In Article 35B the introduction of 'State responsibil-
ity' is hardly convincing and no precedents or analogies
could be quoted from the area of space law. In the field of
space law States have accepted 'State responsibility' to-
wards another State but not directly to any individual suf-
fering damage; furthermore, such responsibility attaches
in fact to State activities for the launching of spacecraft. 68
It seems that different viewpoints come from different
occupational backgrounds. On the one hand, Dr. M.
Milde has worked in the Air Law Committee of the ICAO
for a long time. Therefore, his opinion is influenced by
the present condition of the air industry. On the other
hand, Professor Bin Cheng has suggested an ideal and fu-
ture framework from a scholastic point of view.
B. Counter-reply of the Drafter
Professor Bin Cheng counter-replied to the above criti-
ques. He had forecasted two of the critiques. He fore-
- Id. at 585-86.
789
790 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
casted the "appropriate time" problem, in which
opponents criticize the Draft because the United States
may ratify the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 and
4. He also foresaw the problem of gaining support from
the airline corporations and recognized the need to en-
courage and persuade, in advance, the airline corpora-
tions to support the Draft before delivering it to the
States, since the States are reluctant to ratify the Draft at
present.
In response to the criticism that the United States may
ratify the Montreal Protocols, Professor Bin Cheng as-
serted that waiting and hoping for the United States to
ratify the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 and 4 is a
waste of time. Moreover, since the ILA is a kind of re-
search institute, it is essential, important and inevitable
for the members of the ILA to research and discuss the
ideal framework to reform the Warsaw Convention dra-
matically and fundamentally. Professor Bin Cheng
pointed out that it is senseless to say that the United
States will not ratify the Draft at present. For example,
the American representative asserted to the Air Law Com-
mittee of the ICAO in 1965 that it was very difficult for
the United States to ratify the Rome Convention, since
the absolute liability principle prescribed in the Rome
Convention was totally contrary to the deep-rooted legal
tradition of the United States. In a scant ten months after
that assertion, however, the United States imposed abso-
lute liability on foreign airlines carrying out business in
the United States territory in accordance with the Mon-
treal Agreement of 1966.69 Thus, Professor Bin Cheng
concluded that it is naive to think that each State's posi-
tion is unchangeable.
The cooperative drafter Professor J. D. de la Rochere
also replied to the critique submitted by Professor M.
Bradley. First, the research on the Draft by the ILA does
not have any potential influence upon the possible ratifi-
- Fujita, A Survey on Compensation for Damage Caused to Passengers by International
Aircraft Accidents, 17 JURISPRUDENCE J. (Hougakoo Zassi) 90.
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cation by the United States of the Guatemala Protocol and
the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 and 4. Second,
the purpose for distributing the Draft to the international
organizations was not to make it conclusive, but to take
into account the comments or responses made by the in-
ternational organizations. Third, "unlimited liability"
and "liability secured by the States" are not new topics at
all.
Because the counter-replies submitted by the drafters
are very abstract, the opponents are not satisfied with
them. However, the Draft deserves continuous research
and discussion.
C. Professor K. Fujita's Opinion
In balancing the burden on the air carrier under the ab-
solute and unlimited liability principle with the interests
of the victims, the Draft emphasizes only the responsibil-
ity of the air carrier. Professor Bin Cheng considers the
burden placed on the air carrier by the Draft small and
trivial, but his opponents disagree. Nobody knows how
much claims will increase under an unlimited liability
principle, particularly in the United States which permits
tremendous amounts of compensation for damages. The
inevitable increase in insurance costs will certainly be bur-
densome to small or medium-sized airline corporations.
Without a detailed economic analysis of accident compen-
sation, no conclusion can be drawn regarding the Draft's
effect upon insurance costs. Since the unlimited liability
principle is not the sole solution to meeting both the
needs of the air carrier and those of consumers, it is too
early to adopt the Draft.
The second point to be considered is that under Article
35B of the Draft, the national State of the carrier becomes
responsible for the liabilities of the carrier on the premise
that the State permits its carriers to obtain financial secur-
ity only up to a specified maximum.70 It is questionable
70 Sixtieth Conference, supra note 28, at 573-74. Article 35B provides:
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that the national State of a private carrier could be the
ultimate guarantor of the carriers' business activities. The
principle of secured liability should be entrusted to each
State for its voluntary decision and should not be en-
forced by means of the Draft.
Third, channeling liability to the air carrier or the air-
craft operator is desirable since such channeling is not too
burdensome to air carriers. De facto channeling of liabil-
ity is possible by fixing the maximum amount of liability
and giving a domestic supplement to the dissatisfied
claimants as under the Guatemala Protocol and the Mon-
treal Additional Protocol No. 3.
Finally, the Draft is an integrated system of liability in-
cluding both damages caused during international car-
riage by air based on contract and damages caused by
foreign aircraft to third parties on the surface based on
tort. However, separation of those liability provisions will
make a more reasonable and secured liability system. The
Draft should differentiate contract liability from tort liabil-
ity and separate them from each other.7' Because en-
forcement of the liability principles as prescribed in the
Draft will be difficult, it is too early to adopt the Draft.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS (AUTHOR'S
PERSONAL OPINION)
I have explained the brief history of the Draft, its back-
ground, structure, guiding principles, critiques and
counter-replies and Professor K. Fujita's opinion. Now, I
would like to present my own opinion.
In cases where a carrier and the person furnishing financial security
pursuant to Article 35A of this Convention both fail to meet their
liabilities arising under this Convention, and in those cases where a
contracting State permits its carriers to obtain financial security only
up to specified maxima, the national State of the carrier becomes
responsible for the liabilities of the carrier and of the person furnish-
ing such financial security arising under the present Convention to
the extent to which such liabilities have not been met.
Id.
' Some Considerations, supra note 18, at 113-16.
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Let me begin with a review of the guiding principles of
Professor Bin Cheng's Draft for the Convention, which
proposes to dramatically revise the Warsaw system that
has played such an important role in the international car-
riage by air for a half century. First, the "absolute and
unlimited liability principle," which has been the hot issue
of the Draft, has several problems. Unlimited liability with
respect to death or injury of passengers imposes a heavy
burden on the air carrier. The international community
will not easily disregard the limited liability system, which
has existed for fifty years. 7 2 Furthermore, under the un-
limited liability principle, the amount of compensation for
damages will differ according to the domestic laws of each
country. As a result, the unlimited liability principle un-
derlying the Draft entrusts to the States the selection of
the liability system. The large gap in compensation
amounts resulting from the application of different do-
mestic laws may lead to international conflict among air-
line corporations and to dissatisfaction among
passengers. In addition, the unlimited liability principle
may give rise to an increase in insurance premiums, which
in turn would make air transportation costs increase. Fi-
nally, the unlimited liability principle should not apply
only to a passenger's death or injury during international
carriage by air, since other conventions, including con-
ventions limiting shipowner's liability, the convention on
liability of the operators of nuclear ships, and the United
Nations' convention on international multimodal trans-
portation, presently apply the limited liability principle.
The Draft is idealistic but not realistic. It is realistic to
maintain the limited liability system for the time being, to
take the domestic supplement according to the Guatemala
Protocol, and, of course, to ratify the Montreal Additional
Protocols Nos. 3 and 4.
72 The Draft is different from the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, the
Guatemala Protocol and the Montreal Additional Protocols, because it does not
prescribe the maximum amount of liability with respect to passengers' deaths or
injuries.
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The second guiding principle of the Draft, the secured
liability provisions of Article 35B, ensures that the car-
rier's liability will be covered. It is unreasonable, how-
ever, for a State to be involved in private aviation
activities and to become an ultimate guarantor of air car-
rier liability. A viable alternative might be the establish-
ment of an international fund for compensation of air
accident damages under the auspices of the ICAO or the
United Nations.73
The third guiding principle of the Draft is the channel-
ing of liability to the air carrier or aircraft operator as pre-
scribed in Article 30 of the Draft. Such channeling of
liability is necessary and essential to compensate the vic-
tims more efficiently and speedily.
The Draft should unify and integrate the complicated
framework of the Warsaw system and the Rome Conven-
tion regarding an air carrier's liability for damages caused
to third parties on the surface by foreign aircraft. The
conventions, agreements and protocols which regulate in-
ternational carriage by air at present are so complicated
and divergent that only air law specialists understand the
details. Integrating those conventions and agreements
into one convention would solve many problems among
passengers, cargo owners, air carriers and insurance com-
panies. In view of the trend to unify private air laws, our
efforts to integrate and unify the conventions and agree-
ments in the past might be helpful and play at least a par-
tial role in establishing worldwide uniform law in the
future.74 The Draft itself, the guiding principles thereof,
and the approach used in it, shall be important and essen-
tial material for those who are interested in the future re-
form of the Warsaw system.
One possible way to unify the rules of the Warsaw Con-
vention and those rules regarding the assessment of dam-
7:1 International research and discussion of this alternative could begin with the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 1971.
74 NOGAMI, THEORY OF AIR COMMERCIAL LAW 3-7 (1984).
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ages, which may be idealistic, would be to establish a
World Court of Aviation Law with jurisdiction to resolve
claims arising out of international aviation disasters. In
this court, the procedural and substantive law must be
uniform and just. The creation of other international
courts demonstrates that such a court is possible.75 This
World Court of Aviation Law could hear any claim grow-
ing out of both international air crash accidents and trans-
national accidents in which the plaintiffs and defendants
are from different nations. This alternative would elimi-
nate the lack of uniformity of decisions under the Warsaw
system.7 6 In addition, national courts would no longer
have to apply their own choice of law analysis in choosing
the applicable liability limits for cases that do not fall
under the Warsaw system. Thus, creation of a World
Court of Aviation Law would eliminate any disparity of
damage awards among similarly situated passengers in
non-Warsaw system cases.
The creation of a World Court on Aviation Law could
provide the uniformity of decision currently lacking in
claims arising out of commercial aviation accidents. Until
a World Court of Aviation Law is established to handle
such claims and to provide some measure of uniformity,
attorneys acting in their client's best interest should
closely scrutinize the court's choice of law rules.
It is urgently necessary for us to make a new Draft for
the Convention on an Integrated System of International
Aviation Liability and to create a World Court on Aviation
Law to handle international aircrash litigation. I shall
propose to make a new brief Draft for the Convention on
7 The International Court ofJustice was created by the United Nations Charter
in 1945. Comment, The Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for International
Aviation Accidents, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 953, 997 n.301 (1986). The court handles
disputes between nations. Id. For a list of the seventy cases filed with the court as
ofJuly, 1984, see 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 3-6 (1984). Id.
76 The Warsaw system need not be destroyed, however. Professor Matte of Mc-
Gill University suggests creating an International Court of Appeals or extending
jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice at the Hague to decide Warsaw
Convention cases.
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an Integrated System of International Liability and to cre-
ate a World Court of Aviation Law in the future.
Comments

